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This article examines recent changes in the role played by the International Labour 
Organization in Sub-Saharan Africa in historical perspective. It argues that the globalization of 
production has created a novel set of political and economic problems surrounding work and 
labour in Africa. The ILO’s activities in Africa have been an important means by which 
African states and organized labour, along with the ILO itself, have adapted themselves to 
these challenges. These programmes have opened up new opportunities for action by states 
and workers in Africa, but these have at times been used in exclusionary ways. This argument 
is advanced by first considering the historical trajectory of the ILO’s activities in Africa and 
then by examining two new programmes, the Decent Work Country Programmes initiative 
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 From the late 1990s, the role of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the 
global political economy has shifted dramatically. The transformation of the ILO’s relationship 
with Sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the most striking changes. The region seemingly went 
overnight from an afterthought to the centerpiece of many new programmes and initiatives. In 
the past decade the ILO has taken on an active role in shaping policy through its Decent Work 
Country Programs (DWCPs), helped reinforce private voluntary labour regulations in Lesotho 
through its Better Work initiative, played a significant role in debates over pensions, increased 
its involvement in technical and financial aid allocation, and even helped to establish 
cooperatives in Eastern and Southern Africa. Two obvious questions suggest themselves. The 
first is explanatory: why Africa and why now? The second is evaluative: how well can these new 
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programs improve developmental and distributional outcomes for Africans and African 
workers? 
These questions are both best answered by considering the historical relationship 
between the ILO and Africa in its global context. Robert Cox and others have made note of the 
precarious relationship between the ILO and the structure of prevailing world orders (e.g. Cox 
1977, 1980; Vosko 2002). For much of its history the institution has walked a fine line 
between incorporating some segments of labour into structures of hegemonic order and 
providing opportunities for workers to better their position within those structures. Building 
on these previous analyses, this paper argues that the ILO’s activities in Africa represent an 
effort at managing the political challenges arising out of the globalisation of production for 
states, civil society, and international organizations. Where in previous periods the ILO’s 
priorities and those of African states and labour were broadly incompatible, the globalisation of 
production poses complementary challenges to both. This has pushed African states and 
organised labour into closer coordination with the ILO. These new modes of cooperation have 
facilitated the efforts of some actors in dealing with the challenges posed by global production, 
while simultaneously reinforcing some patterns of exclusion and domination. 
The ILO’s activities, then, are best understood in relation to the interactions between 
prevailing structures of production and political order at national and international levels. This 
approach stands to make a valuable contribution to understanding this topic for two reasons. 
First, it offers a broader and more complete picture of the recent changes (1) in the role of the 
ILO in world politics, and (2) in African labour relations than can be offered by approaches 
focused on one or the other. Authors have often applied perspectives on the bureaucratic 
politics of IOs (see Barnett and Finnemore 2004) or international law in attempts to explain 
the ILO’s recent activities (e.g. Cooney 1999, Helfer 2006). Most studies of African labour 
relations, on the other hand, tend to focus on the national or comparative level (see e.g. Wood 
and Brewster 2007) rather than the global or international context.  
Second, it offers a means of moving beyond simply questioning the effectiveness or 
desirability of particular policies in order to ask questions about what this case can say about 
the possibilities and limitations of the existing structures of the global political economy. The 
evaluative question introduced above has preoccupied a good deal of recent commentary on 
the ILO. Standing (2008, 2010) has criticized the ILO for moving towards a focus on a limited 
set of ‘negative’ rights – for instance the abolition of child labour or prohibitions of 
discrimination – at the expense of ‘positive’ enabling social rights. Caraway (2006) has 
similarly criticized the ILO for advocating a model of ‘free association’ encouraging 
competition among fragmentary unions rather than powerful centralized collective bargaining. 
A number of other authors conversely suggest that this shift represents an appropriate 
prioritization of its activities and adaptation to changing circumstances (Rodgers et al. 2009, 
Blanpain and Engels 2001, Hughes 2005, Helfer 2006, Cooney 1999). 
By looking at the ILO’s programs in Africa in their wider historical and global context, 
the approach taken here enables serious consideration not only of the desirability of the ILO’s 
policies in Africa but also of the possibilities and limitations within which they operate. The 
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fundamental power relationships and political accommodations through which these programs 
are formulated and implemented have significant implications for their potential effectiveness. 
 
 
THE ILO, AFRICA, AND WORLD ORDER – THREE PERIODS 
I advance this argument by presenting a historical narrative outlining the role of the ILO 
in Africa through three configurations of social relations of production and world order: 
 
1.  From the end of World War II until around 1980 the ILO acted as a proponent of 
the tripartite model of social relations of production that dominated Europe and North 
America. Tripartism applied poorly to the African context and African states were 
preoccupied with development and the consolidation of state power in their foreign 
affairs. The ILO’s activities in Africa were thus quite limited. 
2.  Between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, the emergence of global forms of 
production led to a breakdown of both tripartism and the post-independence African 
state. The ILO struggled for most of the period to make itself relevant to the changing 
global order. Production in Africa was substantially reshaped in this period, posing 
significant political challenges for organized labour and states across the continent. 
3.  In the last ten to fifteen years the ILO has adopted a new role and new priorities in 
order to adapt itself to contemporary social relations of production. The ILO’s 
activities in Africa in this sense represent efforts to establish a new, albeit weak, form of 
political order regulating global production. The priorities adopted by the ILO and by 
African states and civil society in this period are much more compatible than in 
previous periods. 
 
This third period is the primary focus of the paper. Emphasizing the historical development of 
the relationship between the ILO and Africa will underscore the importance of the reciprocal 
relationship emphasized in this paper. Thus, the paper considers each of these periods 
separately, examining the ways in which the interactions between the social relations of 




Tripartism, Embedded Liberalism and the Post-independence State 
Ruggie (1982) has described the world order that prevailed after World War II as 
‘embedded liberalism’: a system of open economic exchange in which states could still 
intervene to protect domestic markets and social outcomes. Production in the core economies 
was generally organized on the basis of tripartite coordination between large industrial firms, 
national or sectoral trade union confederations, and the state. Tripartism was aimed at the 
bureaucratization of labour relations, the maintenance of high standards of living for unionized 
workers, and the stabilization of cyclical patterns of economic activity (Cox 1987: 74-82). 
However, this was hardly an egalitarian order. Standing (1999) and Harrod (1987) in 
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particular have argued that economic security was the privilege of white, male, unionized 
workers in the developed world.  
The ILO’s activities in relation to this order were shaped by two factors. First, the 
conflicted relationship between the United States and the ILO often preoccupied the 
institution. American government, business and labour often sought either to dominate the 
organization or (failing that) to undermine it. The Cold War conflict thus deeply permeated 
the activities of the ILO. American organized labour, especially the dominant American 
Federation of Labour – Congress of Industrial Organizations, was as concerned with 
preventing the spread of communism as the United States government. Second, the ILO 
played a key role in legitimating the tripartite arrangement of social relations of production 
that prevailed in Europe and North America through its standard setting and research 
activities. The ILO’s role was in these respects closely linked to the prevailing American-
dominated embedded liberal world order and tripartite mode of social relations of production 
(see Cox 1977, Lorenz 2001, Myconos 2005). 
 
 
AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY POST-INDEPENDENCE 
 Africa’s relationship with the ILO in this period was limited by precisely these two 
defining features. In the first instance, tripartism was a poor fit in Africa, although for different 
reasons in tropical Africa and in the white ruled states in southern Africa.  
At the time of independence neither a well-developed capitalist class nor a strong 
working class was present in tropical Africa. Most of the population was engaged in small-scale 
agriculture. Neither were there many strong states. Further, organized labour, capital and the 
state as had developed in Africa at the time were often closely entwined. There is little need to 
recap in detail here the debates about the intertwinement of the so-called ‘bureaucratic’ and 
‘business’ bourgeoisies and the centrality of the state apparatus to strategies of accumulation in 
Africa (see Bayart 2009: Ch. 3). For the purposes of this paper it will suffice to note the close 
integration of the state and bureaucracy with both foreign and indigenous capital typical of 
most African countries in the period in question.  
Trade unions were generally also closely integrated into the single party state. This 
involved the differentiation between a unionized working class on the one hand and the great 
bulk of the population on the other – both the urban informal sector and rural agricultural 
labour, mostly smallholders. A certain degree of ambivalence on the part of unions about the 
loss of independence was visible – especially among rank and file workers (see Jeffries 1978, 
Lukes 1984). Nonetheless, organized labour was typically under the control of the state. 
Contemporary authors (Berg 1966) and later commentators (Panford 1994) have noted 
that this close relationship between the state, capital and labour made it difficult for the state to 
participate in tripartite negotiations as an impartial referee, and indeed complicated bipartite 
negotiations between capital and labour. The ILO’s preferred model of tripartism, in short, was 
a poor fit with the structures of production and political order that predominated in tropical 
Africa at the time.  
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Tripartism was also a poor fit, albeit for different reasons, in the white-ruled states of 
southern Africa.1 Relative to tropical Africa there were well developed capitalist and working 
classes, but the racial structure of labour relations in South Africa and its satellites posed its 
own set of problems. While the ILO did engage with the white unions and the Apartheid 
regime in the immediate post-war period, it distanced itself from the white government as anti-
Apartheid unions increasingly appealed to the ILO for legitimation. The ILO ultimately cut off 
relations with the Apartheid regime in 1964. 
 
 
AFRICA IN THE EMBEDDED LIBERAL WORLD ORDER 
A second major limitation on the role of the ILO, at least as far as ‘tropical’ Africa is 
concerned, was posed by the ILO’s preoccupation with the Cold War conflict. This sat at odds 
with the primacy of developmental concerns in African governments’ external relations. 
Two issues occupied the bulk African foreign affairs in the early post-independence 
period. First, a good deal of time was expended on regional diplomacy within Africa aimed at 
consolidating borders in ways that would allow state building projects to be carried out 
without interference (Herbst 2000). Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this 
paper, most of the continent’s leaders were more interested in the North-South conflict than in 
the Cold War conflict. Given limited capacity to transform domestic societies, the idea that 
development issues were primarily exogenous was politically convenient and intuitively 
appealing (Murphy 1983, Shaw 1979). The priority assigned to development and state-
building meant that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and General 
Assembly rather than the ILO or other specialized agencies, were the focus of most African 
governments’ engagements with the international system (Taylor 2003). 
The ILO did play some, albeit limited and relatively passive, role in Africa in this period 
(see Panford 1994). Zambia, for instance, ratified 45 ILO conventions between 1977 and 1983 
– including 35 in 1983 alone (Kalula 1985). African states faced few repercussions for not 
adhering to the Conventions they ratified. Adopting ILO standards could thus bring some 




Globalizing Production, the State, and Unprotected Work 
The embedded liberal order and the post-independence state in Africa had collapsed 
almost completely by the end of the 1980s. The Apartheid system in southern Africa followed 
in the early 1990s. It will serve little use to dwell on the near-global shift to neoliberal 
economic governance here. Rather, I examine changes to the structure of African political 







STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND LIBERALIZATION 
The state-led model of development in Africa and elsewhere had come to rest on high 
levels of external borrowing which were no longer possible after the early 1980s. Almost all 
states on the continent turned at some point to the Bretton Woods institutions for emergency 
loans, which were conditional on adopting structural adjustment packages (SAPs) aimed at 
radical economic liberalization. South Africa, in less dire financial straits but facing the difficult 
economic transition away from Apartheid, underwent a similar process of liberalization in the 
1990s. Two things about SAPs are significant here. First, economic opening was a necessary 
condition for Africa’s involvement in global production. Second, and more importantly, labour 
was ejected from ruling coalitions (Tidjani 1998). Structural adjustment broke the formerly 
close links between organized labour and the state, as well as weakening unions’ bargaining 
power with employers. 
Structural adjustment also indirectly undermined many of the single party or military 
governments that had predominated after independence. Unions and social movements 
negatively impacted by SAPs played a major role in the nearly region-wide advent of multi-
party elections. Democratization, however, did little to alter economic policies or outcomes. 
Trade unions have thus remained largely oppositional in their relations to the state since (Kraus 
2007). This distance created a novel set of challenges for both. For unions, access to financial 
and organizational resources is limited. For states, the loss of control over trade unions has 
created a need to find new means of managing politically dangerous labour issues. 
 
 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION 
 The other major change in this period was the globalization of production. Social 
relations of production are increasingly organized on a global scale. The major driving force 
behind the global reorganization of production has been the growing structural power of major 
transnational corporations. Structural power is understood, following Susan Strange, as power 
over the way activity is organized and the availability of resources (Strange 1988, 1996; cf. Gill 
and Law 1989). The most obvious way in which this is evident is the expansion of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). FDI flows expanded dramatically after 1980 – growing from less than 
one hundred billion USD to a peak in 2007 at over two trillion USD (UNCTAD 2010: 2, fig. 
1.1). Granted, by this measure Africa is not particularly ‘globalised’, receiving a negligible 
proportion of total world FDI (UNCTAD, n.d.).  
However, a second important set of developments – transnational outsourcing, 
subcontracting and other flexible production strategies – is increasingly important. The global 
value chains or global production networks literature is tremendously useful in pointing to 
these developments (see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994, Henderson et al. 2002). Gereffi’s 
(1994) concept of a ‘buyer driven’ value chain is particularly useful here. Retailers with 
recognised brands dominate access to lucrative markets in the developed world. This enables 
them to set standards for suppliers governing the quality and cost of finished goods, as well as 
the timing, cost and qualitative aspects of the processes by which they are produced (Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005, Kaplinsky 2010). To put the concept into the terms used here, 
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retailers exercise a form of structural power over production by virtue of their ability to control 
access to markets. 
 
 
GLOBAL PRODUCTION AND AFRICA 
A considerable literature has emerged in the last ten years examining the increasing 
importance of buyer driven global value chains in Africa. Production is increasingly carried out 
for buyer-driven value chains organized by TNCs based in core countries (Gibbon and Ponte 
2005). Here again, an important degree of convergence between southern and tropical Africa is 
visible. 
The increased prominence of these value chains has changed the ways in which 
production in Africa is organised. Small-scale producers in horticultural sectors have been 
unable to meet the standards for cost, quality, and flexibility required by retailers in Europe. 
The end result has often been a shift to production on large farms employing wage labour – 
studies of Kenya’s export horticulture sector (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, McCullough and 
Ota 2002, Gibbon 2003a, Jensen 2008), and South Africa’s citrus sector (Mather and 
Greenberg 2003) reflect this pattern. In the case of traditional export crops – cocoa, cotton and 
coffee – African participation in global value chains has increasingly been restricted to 
agricultural production, as intermediate forms of processing come under pressure from the 
quality and cost demands of global buyers (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 145-160, Fold and Ponte 
2008, Ponte 2002, Mosley and Gray 2008). Some new sectors have emerged as well. Clothing 
manufacturers moved first into South Africa and Mauritius and then on to lower-wage 
jurisdictions – especially Madagascar and Lesotho, but also increasingly Tanzania and Kenya – 
seeking out low wages in response to growing cost pressures from lead firms in the garment 
industry (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 138-140; Gibbon 2003b, 2003c). 
These developments have been linked to the increasing informalization and casualization 
of work. In horticulture there are very few year-round permanent jobs either on farms or in 
processing facilities (Dolan 2004, Barrientos and Kritzinger 2004, Mather and Greenberg 
2003). Labour in these sectors is overwhelmingly young, mostly female and dominated by 
workers seeking to supplement family income through temporary migration (Dolan 2004). 
The same is true of the garment industry in Lesotho and Madagascar (Gibbon 2003b, 2003c; 
Glick and Roubaud 2006) and mining in southern Africa, although in the latter case 
employment is still male-dominated (Niemann 2006). Casualization and migration have also 
contributed to the expansion of the informal economy and its increasing entwinement with the 
formal sector. 
Many of these trends have been compounded by investments from China and other 
emerging markets. Chinese firms in particular have tended to prefer to import Chinese workers 
rather than hire local, especially in managerial positions. Chinese operations in Zambia’s 
copper sector, both in mining itself and in retail and other services around the mines, have 
come under particularly harsh criticism on this point (Gadzala 2010, Lee 2009). Some Chinese 
and other East Asian firms have adopted similar hiring practices in the garment industry 
(Wong 2006, Brooks 2010, Lee 2009, Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 139). The rise of Chinese 
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involvement in Africa is most notable here in its contribution to wider processes of 
informalization and casualization of work.2  
Harrod’s (1987) concept of ‘unprotected work’ is useful in understanding these changes 
(see Davies and Ryner 2006). Unprotected work is in precarious, informal, or marginal types of 
economic activity, directly or indirectly subject to the decisions of actors with structural power 
in which workers have no say. Of course, unprotected work has been prevalent in Africa for the 
entire period in question, and indeed we should not attribute the increase in informal and 
casual work entirely to globalization – retrenchment in the public sector has also contributed 
(Wood and Brewster 2007). The globalization of production is nonetheless significant in two 
ways. First, the relative prevalence of particular forms of unprotected work has shifted as 
Africans have both been pushed out of subsistence-smallholder agriculture into (often 
casualized) wage work and out of formal sector jobs into the informal sector and casual wage 
work. Second, these new patterns of unprotected work are more deeply entrenched as Africans 
are increasingly incorporated into hierarchically organized transnational relations of production 
subject to the structural power of distant core actors. While major TNCs are rarely directly 
involved in Sub-Saharan Africa, their influence over the structure of production – that is, over 
the range of possible configurations of economic organization – is increasingly important. 
For states in Africa long hampered by limited institutional, financial, and human 
resources, these shifts in the social relations of production present considerable political 
problems. Civil society within and outside Africa, especially the increasingly independent trade 
unions, remains capable of mobilizing. At times this has taken the form of nationalist responses 
to foreign involvement – exemplified by the anti-Chinese rhetoric of Michael Sata’s campaigns 
in the 2006 and 2011 elections in Zambia (see Larmer and Fraser 2007). More important, 
though, is the broader loss of control over the trade union movement in the context of 
profound labour market restructuring. Conventional forms of labour regulation are less 
applicable and less effective than previously, yet labour politics are also more pressing. 
 
 
THE ILO, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MOVEMENT, AND GLOBAL 
PRODUCTION 
 Of course, many of these trends are not confined to Africa. Guy Standing (1999), 
among others, has noted the global erosion of secure, stable, and protected work in favour of 
more flexible modes of labour organization. A number of authors have noted the challenges 
this has posed for the ILO (e.g. Cooney 1999, Helfer 2006, Maupain 2009, Hughes 2005), 
and for existing configurations of international labour more generally (O’Brien 2000, Myconos 
2005). The ILO’s organization and goals were tied to a fairly rigid set of conventions of 
questionable enforceability and based in a mode of industrial organization under threat even in 
the narrow segment of the globe to which it had ever applied. 
 Efforts to establish new modes of labour standards in response to the pressures of global 
production date from the late 1980s. The ILO was more or less sidelined, as the international 
labour movement focused on organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the ability to sanction violators (Myconos 2005: 
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145). The issue came to a head in 1996 at the WTO’s Singapore Ministerial where the US and 
European delegations, under pressure from the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, pushed for a resolution incorporating labour standards into the WTO’s rules (see 
O’Brien et al. 2000). The final resolution in Singapore did reaffirm the ILO’s status as the 
appropriate institution to manage international labour standards. However, the position of the 
ILO at the time was such that the decision of the Singapore Ministerial might be attributed 
primarily to a desire among states and business actors to avoid enforceable labour standards. 
 The ILO was not unique in struggling to situate itself with respect to new patterns of 
social relations of production. Engaging with transnational business remains a challenge for the 
United Nations system as a whole (Ruggie 2004, Pauly 2008). The issue is, however, 
particularly pressing for the ILO, whose purpose and fundamental organizing principles have 
been called into question. 
   
 
Africa and the New ILO 
 The ILO’s response to these challenges has also been one of the most sweeping. It 
strongly de-emphasized its old framework of conventions. The 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work reoriented the institution’s focus towards four 
‘core’ conventions: the elimination of child labour, the elimination of forced labour, guarantees 
of freedom of association, and anti-discrimination policies. Shortly thereafter, in 1999 the ILO 
announced a new ‘Decent Work’ agenda with four main objectives: promoting employment, 
promoting rights at work, promoting social protections, and promoting ‘social dialogue’ (ILO 
1999). In short, ‘Decent Work’ was a shift away from rigid conventions towards more a more 
flexible language. A less formally stated but no less significant change has been the increased 
emphasis given to the ILO’s operations in the developing world, especially Africa.  
 Three significant new patterns of ILO activity in Africa are visible. First, the ILO has 
taken on an active role in policy-making and resource allocation. Second, it has moved towards 
serious engagement with TNCs and corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. These two 
developments are considered in more detail below. A third trend has been a move beyond 
labour standards to deal more substantively with issues of social policy and development. For 
instance, the ILO has been involved in pension reform debates in Africa – often serving as a 
counterweight to IMF and World Bank demands for liberalization (see Kpessa and Beland 
2012). It has also established a ‘Cooperative Facility for Africa’ (CoopAfrica) promoting 
purchasing cooperatives for the urban poor in Eastern and Southern Africa. For the sake of 
space, the paper only deals in detail with the first two developments, which are directly relevant 
to labour standards. 
 
 
Decent Work Country Programs – From Standard Setting to Active Policy 
Making 
‘Decent Work Country Programs’ (DWCPs) are broad national strategies for 
implementing the Decent Work agenda. They are established through consultations between 
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states, business associations and civil society with the ILO, intended to allow for policy 
measures to be tailored to the exigencies of particular settings. They are intended to formulate 
policy instruments for achieving the broad goals of the Decent Work agenda, as well as to 
identify areas where the ILO’s technical and financial assistance are needed (ILO 2008a, Ghai 
2006). 
Significantly, Africa is disproportionately represented among countries who have 
adopted or are in the process of formulating DWCPs. At the time of writing, 20 of 61 
currently active DWCPs, as well as 25 of 49 in the drafting stage, had been established in 
Africa (ILO 2011a). The rest of this section considers the contents and implementation of 




THE ANATOMY OF THE DWCPS 
 The DWCPs all identify priority areas for labour and employment policy. At the time 
of writing there were 20 DWCPs publicly available; Table 1 provides a breakdown of the 
priority areas identified in these programs.3 The first notable aspect of the programs is the 
uneven application of the four pillars of the Decent Work agenda. All of the DWCPs currently 
available highlight employment promotion, often focusing on creating opportunities in the 
formal sector for young workers. Further, in some cases – for example Madagascar (ILO 
2010a) and Sierra Leone (ILO 2010b) – ‘social protection’ and ‘social dialogue’ are framed as 
issues of ‘productivity’ or ‘competitiveness’. About half highlight strengthening social dialogue 
and expanding social protection. Only five highlight improving labour standards or rights at 
work, with another three (Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) specifically focusing on eliminating 
child labour. 
The programmes also specify arrangements for implementing the DWCPs. National 
committees for implementing the DWCP are called for in most of the programs. These 
committees are, in theory, administered by national ‘social partners’ under the supervision of 
the ILO’s regional offices. The ILO is also called on to play a role in mobilizing financial aid 
and technical expertise. Some programs include budgets, for example Cote D’Ivoire (ILO, 
2008b) and Botswana (ILO, 2011c). The DWCP for Ethiopia even specifies particular foreign 
governments’ agencies from which the ILO is to pursue funding for the Ethiopian programme 
(ILO, 2009a). The ILO is positioned as a ‘gatekeeper’ of sorts for development aid, its approval 
is needed for states to access funds from donors.  
Admittedly this ‘gatekeeper’ role raises the question of the autonomy of the ILO from 
donors in setting policy priorities. Nonetheless, the variability in the application of core 
conventions in Decent Work programs suggests that if there is pressure on the ILO from these 
sources it is minimal. ‘Decent Work’ ought to be read mainly as a package of discursive and 
material resources made available to, and negotiated with, African states rather than a set of 





Table 1: DWCP Priorities 
Priority Area Countries 
Employment Promotion 20 - All 
Strengthening Social 
Dialogue/Tripartism 
12 - Benin, Botswana; Comoros; Kenya; Lesotho; Madagascar; 





11 - Benin, Botswana; Comoros; Ethiopia; Kenya; Lesotho; 
Malawi; Namibia; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Togo 
 
HIV/AIDS in the Workplace 6 - Lesotho; Namibia; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe 
Improved Labour 
Standards/Administration or Rights at 
Work 
5 - Botswana; Comoros; Ethiopia; Seychelles; South Africa 
Elimination of Child Labour 3 - Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia 
Elimination of Discrimination/Gender 
Equity 
2 - Mauritius; Zimbabwe 
Other 2 - Lesotho (special focus on garment/textile sector, improving 





THE DWCPS AS RESOURCES FOR POLITICAL ACTION 
 The important question to consider here is what role the DWCPs have played in the 
engagements of states and organised labour with the challenges posed by global production. 
One way to go about answering this question is to look at the extent to which states’ 
commitments under the DWCPs have been implemented. The problem, however, is that most 
of these programmes are quite new and very little material on their implementation is available. 
This is compounded by two further problems. First, the ILO tends to focus narrowly on 
changes to legislation in evaluating the progress of its programmes (see ILO 2006, 2007a, 
2008c, 2009b). Second, data collection on labour and workforce issues in Africa is often quite 
limited. Nonetheless, a few early indicators of the practical applications of the DWCPs are 
telling. 
One source of information comes from ILO-commissioned independent reviews of 
recently completed programmes in Tanzania and Zambia. The review of Zambia’s DWCP 
found mixed results. On the one hand, the ILO seems to have played a significant role in 
mobilizing resources and building capacity for trade unions, business organisations, and the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services (Kumar-Range and Henry 2008: 19-23). The review 
was critical, though, of the applicability of the DWCP’s priorities to the upwards of 80 percent 
of the working population engaged in the informal sector. It also complains of the vagueness of 
the programme’s priorities and strategies (Kumar-Range and Henry 2008: 25-28).  
120 
 
 Many of the same problems were evident in Tanzania (Dagsteer and Guzman 2010). 
The problems posed by the lack of measurable goals are again raised in the report. The authors 
also note that the DWCP in Tanzania seems to have been formulated by the ILO without 
much input from the Ministry of Labour or civil society actors. While the DWCP did result in 
some important capacity building for Ministry of Labour, there is no mention in the report of 
similar efforts to develop the capacities of civil society groups. Indeed, the report hints that the 
ILO’s activities in Tanzania overlapped or conflicted with those of non-governmental 
organisations and civil society (Dagsteer and Guzman 2010: 28). The relative neglect of the 
informal sector is also mentioned as a problem. The ambiguity of the DWCP priorities, then, 
seems to have inhibited their implementation and their effectiveness in actually raising labour 
standards in practice.  
However, to stop here would miss the significance of the move to the DWCPs from 
more rigid standards and conventions in practice. The ambiguity of the DWCPs enhances their 
usefulness to some actors as political resources. Three examples are illustrative here. The ILO’s 
technical cooperation functions, boosted by the Decent Work Agenda, have facilitated trade 
union input into the Organization pour l’Harmonization en Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA) code of labour rights. OHADA is a regional institution seeking to harmonize 
business regulations across Francophone Africa. A common code for labour rights has been 
planed since 1992 but little progress has been made until recently. The ILO’s emphasis on 
‘social dialogue’ under Decent Work has both helped to push the initiative forward – albeit not 
to the point of the adoption of a common code at the time of writing – and has enabled labour 
input into its contents (Blackett 2011).  
Similarly, Zambian domestic workers, again facilitated by resources made available by 
the country’s DWCP, have taken to participating in ILO and International Trade Union 
Confederation campaigns for domestic workers’ rights. They have had some notable successes. 
Most important has been an increase in the minimum wage for domestic workers (Times of 
Zambia 2012).  
Finally, the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) (a 
regional trade union confederation within the Southern African Development Community) 
has recently adopted the idea of ‘Decent Work’ into its policy advocacy. In 2005 the SATUCC 
issued an outline of an ‘Alternative Development’ framework for Southern Africa in which 
Decent Work is not mentioned, and the ILO in general is referenced once (Kanyenze 2005). 
By 2010 ‘Decent Work’ was a core focal point of the organization’s advocacy. The SATUCC 
published a policy paper highlighting the need to focus on poverty reduction in order to 
accomplish the Decent Work agenda (Makanza 2010). Much of the substantive content of the 
two documents is similar, but the 2010 paper advertises itself as advancing ‘Decent Work’.  
The important point about all three of these cases is that trade unions have found it 
useful to engage with the ILO’s resources and to try to frame their claims in ways that are 
compatible with the ILO’s initiatives. There are, however, certain patterns of exclusion that 
might also come with the availability of these resources. They are available only to more 
established forms of labour organization. The increasing proportion of the population engaged 
in unprotected forms of work has little access to the set of resources that come with DWCPs, 
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indeed the programmes themselves are notable for their neglect of the informal sector. 
Marginal workers will only benefit from the ILO’s programmes only to the extent that more 
established workers concern themselves with them. 
 Further, the resources provided through Decent Work need not necessarily be 
employed in the interests of workers at all. The government of Zimbabwe moved to abolish 
some of the National Employment Councils (NECs) set up to supervise the implementation of 
the country’s DWCP in early 2012. It claimed that employers and unions in the NECs had 
been colluding to exploit the DWCPs for private gain, holding deliberately over-long meetings 
in order to be able to claim higher meeting allowances and siphoning off resources. A 
spokesperson for the government claimed such actions undermined the objectives of Decent 
Work (The Herald 2012). Two possible explanations suggest themselves. It is possible that the 
DWCP in Zimbabwe is in fact being exploited for personal gain by unions and business 
associations. Alternatively, it is possible the Zimbabwean government has fabricated or 
exaggerated a concern about corruption in order to avoid implementing the policies in its 
DWCP without actually having to disavow ‘Decent Work’. In either event, the most 
important implication is that the DWCPs and the language of ‘Decent Work’ are relatively 
open for a variety of uses (and abuses), but nonetheless presents an appealing political and 
ideological language for states and labour. 
 The applications of DWCPs, then, are indicative both of the underlying reasons for the 
deeper engagement between the ILO and African states and the limits on their effectiveness. 
They represent a useful political means for the ILO and African states to legitimise their 
authority over labour relations in spite of the considerable governance challenges posed by the 
global reorganization of production relations. The idea of ‘Decent Work’ and the resources 
provided by the ILO provide an appealing, yet ultimately unthreatening, avenue for trade 
unions and states to pursue the advancement of their own political preferences. They risk 
reinforcing existing patterns of exclusion and dominance in making resources available only to 
established actors. In short, the DWCPs have facilitated modes of action and ordering that 
might not necessarily work to the benefit of unprotected workers. 
 
 
Better Work Lesotho – Engaging With Private Authority 
 While the DWCPs have been the primary means of engaging with the ILO for most 
African states, the ILO has also made serious efforts to engage with private authority. In the 
simplest sense the ILO’s core conventions are used as the basis for labour standards in most 
voluntary regulatory programs. The ILO, however, rarely has any active role in shaping these 
programs outside some meetings or informal consultations (see ILO 2007b).  
In recent years the ILO has taken on a much more active role in this respect through its 
‘Better Work Initiative’. Better Work is joint-operated by the ILO and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC – the private lending arm of the World Bank). Where DWCPs 
focus on national level policies, Better Work is aimed ensuring compliance with labour 
standards at the factory level in sectors producing for global buyers. Private actors, including 
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major TNCs, are thus much more prominently involved both in the formulation and 
implementation of Better Work.  
Africa is less central to the Better Work Initiative than it is to Decent Work. At present 
the only African Better Work Programme is in Lesotho. Nonetheless some important patterns 
are visible in Better Work Lesotho. Better Work builds on the previous extension of private 
authority over labour relations in the garment industry in Lesotho. The ILO provides a source 
of financial resources, technical expertise, and above all legitimacy for business and trade union 
actors who have been participating in CSR programs in Lesotho since the 1990s. It is a set of 
resources that have facilitated processes of political ordering. In this case, however, these 
processes had been ongoing to a much greater extent prior to the ILO’s involvement. 
 Already in 1994, the Lesotho Clothing and Allied Workers Union (LECAWU) had 
established links with the US Department of Labour (DoL), providing evidence used to write a 
report on child labour. LECAWU later participated in Northern civil society campaigns 
against sweatshop conditions in the garment industry between 1998 and 2002 (Gibbon 
2003c). LECAWU’s activities, however, have not necessarily been unambiguously positive. 
Gibbs (2005) argues that the union’s international activities have mainly been used to gain 
access to material and political resources used to reinforce the sharply gendered hierarchy 
within the union, with the male union leadership doing little of actual benefit to the largely 
female workforce in garment factories. LECAWU has long sought international connections, 
but not necessarily in the best interests of its members. 
 Nonetheless, LECAWU’s activism seems to have had some impacts on global buyers 
and suppliers. Buyers and suppliers linked to Lesotho’s garment sector have seized on CSR 
programs as a way of raising the value of the clothes produced in the country. In 2008 the 
country’s garment manufacturers unanimously adopted a sector-wide code of conduct in an 
effort to establish a market niche as a source of ‘ethical’ garments (Seidman 2009). In short, 
engagements between organized labour, garment manufacturers, foreign country governments, 
and global civil society had been ongoing for roughly fifteen years before the implementation 
of Better Work.  
 Better Work Lesotho formalizes and legitimizes these relationships. The United States 
DoL is the primary financial supporter of the program in Lesotho, but appears to have limited 
input into the actual implementation of the program (Better Work 2010). Of course, the fact 
that Lesotho is the focus of the program rather than, for instance, the comparable garment 
industry in Madagascar is probably in part explicable by the links between LECAWU and the 
DoL. However, most of the active work designing the program seems to have been carried out 
by the ILO and IFC, global garment buyers, local suppliers, and LECAWU. As a rough 
indication of the autonomy of Better Work from direct influence by the DoL, we might note 
the relatively low priority assigned to the elimination of child labour – increasingly central to 
the DoL’s international activities (see DoL 2012) – in Better Work Lesotho.  
The primary focus of Better Work Lesotho is on training and technical assistance for 
labour inspectors. It is intended to enhance the capacity of buyers and suppliers to enforce 
labour standards at the factory level (Better Work 2010, Better Work 2011). Better labour 
inspection is unquestionably needed in Lesotho; compliance with labour standards in Lesotho’s 
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garment factories has been a major problem (Pike and Godfrey 2011). In this sense to the 
extent that Better Work does contribute to improving the enforcement of labour standards it 
will make a positive contribution to work in Lesotho. 
 There are, however, some potential problems with the program. First, as Seidman 
(2009) suggests, tying the competitiveness of Lesotho’s garment industry – and by extension 
the continued availability of jobs in the sector – to an image of ‘ethical’ production might in 
fact provide a disincentive for workers to raise complaints against employers in the sector. 
Undermining the ‘ethical’ image of Lesotho’s garment sector by reporting violations is likely to 
be more costly for workers than suppliers. Further, Better Work legitimizes existing patterns 
ordering and action to the benefit of the narrow range of actors already participating in the 
private and transnational regulatory arrangements established in Lesotho since the 1990s.  
Better Work is more oriented towards private authority than the DWCPs, but its basic 
function is similar. It represents an effort at responding to the political challenges and conflicts 
emerging from the globalization of production. The ILO’s participation in this case is similarly 
valuable to the actors involved as a source of technical and financial resources and political 
legitimacy. Many of the same basic problems are also evident, it is not clear that the kinds of 
political-economic ordering taking place under Better Work Lesotho are necessarily of benefit 
to unprotected workers. 
 
 
Conclusion – Agency, Action, and Ordering in Global Politics 
 The ILO’s activities in Africa, then, have been fundamentally transformed in the last 
ten to fifteen years. We ought to understand these changes as efforts at establishing new forms 
of political economic order in response to the challenges raised by historical transformations in 
the social relations of production. The importance of changing patterns of production in 
shaping the ILO’s role in Africa is underlined by the historical trajectory outlined here. It is 
significant that it is only in the last decade, with both the ILO and African actors facing 
complementary problems stemming from the globalization of production, that the ILO has 
played a significant role in Africa. It is the political responses of African states, trade unions, 
and the ILO to the reorganization of production – their efforts to maintain their political 
positions in the face of the erosion of the forms of social relations of production that had 
underpinned them – that have shaped the ILO’s role in Africa in the last fifteen years. 
 By way of conclusion, it is worth considering the significance of the ILO in Sub-
Saharan Africa in relation to the broader transformation of the ILO’s role in the global political 
economy since the late 1990s. The application of the programmes in Africa suggests that the 
ILO’s self-reinvention has been significant in the kinds of discursive spaces and material 
resources it has made available for actors in a particular context. This has important 
implications for the ways in which we ought to go about answering the explanatory and 
evaluative questions posed above. How the ILO frames itself or what rules it sets do not matter 
so much as how those rules are put into practice. The unevenness of the ways in which ILO 
programmes have been implemented and used even within Africa underscores this point.  
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This argument might be further explored with more explicit comparison between the 
ILO’s activities in different developing contexts and in other policy areas. Rodriguez-Pinero’s 
(2005) study of the ILO’s Indigenous Rights conventions points to some dynamics similar to 
those highlighted here. The pre-war colonial order shaped the ways in which the organization 
conceived of indigeneity. On the other, the ways in which states and indigenous groups have 
engaged with and sought to reform the ILO’s conventions on indigenous rights have had 
profound impacts. The comparison to East Asia may also be informative. The ILO has had 
limited success in encouraging changes to labour laws outside the implementation of an 
ambitious factory monitoring program in Cambodia (see Caraway 2010, Kolben 2004). The 
Sialkot Child Labour Elimination Project in the Pakistani soccer ball industry, in which the 
ILO has played a key role, is similar in its focus on a politically appealing, but limited area of 
labour rights at the expense of dealing with wider structural issues (see Boje and Khan 2009). A 
wider comparative discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a potentially fruitful 
direction for research. 
 The most that can be said at present is that Decent Work and Better Work are open 
for a variety of forms of action, and that the actions of subaltern actors are not necessarily 
progressive. As many workers and governments in Africa have used the new rules in ways that 
legitimize and reinforce existing structures of power and accumulation as have used them to 
advance the interests of unprotected workers. More fundamentally, the resources made 
available by Decent Work and Better Work are only available to established actors – recognized 
trade unions and states. In this sense the ILO’s programmes reinforce existing patterns of 
power and exclusion. In approaching the problem this way, we can start to get at the ways in 
which the ILO has helped to reinforce existing patterns of production without losing sight of 
the ways in which it might help to transform them if used in certain ways. We ought to 
approach the ILO’s activities as acts of ordering, not as a finished order. 
 The chief importance of this rather cursory overview of the ILO’s activities in Africa, 
then, is to suggest that global governance is an iterative, historically contingent, and dialectical 
process. It is best thought of not as a process of making and enforcing rules, but as a set of 
frameworks and resources that can be applied to differing political projects. The ILO’s new 
agenda since the late 1990s opened up a new set of political, discursive, and material resources 
for African states and trade unions faced with the erosion of the forms of social relations of 
production on which their activities used to rest. The ILO has facilitated thus far partial and 
incomplete efforts at reordering in Africa. The significance of the role of the ILO in Sub-
Saharan Africa accordingly lies not so much in the fact that the institution has found a new 
niche in the context of globalizing relations of production, but rather in the ways in which it 
has enabled some African workers and states to try to meet the challenges posed for them by 
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1.  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
 
2.  There is a wider debate here about the role of Chinese investments in Africa (see Carmody, 
Hampwaye and Sakala 2012, Davies 2011, Ayers 2012). It should suffice to note that my own 
position is closest to Ayers’ (2012) assertion that Chinese involvement is part of wider processes 
of capitalist globalization. 
 
3.  This information here and in Table 1 is based on my own examination of the DWCPs 
available at the time of writing, which are available at www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/ 
program/dwcp/countries/index.htm. It would be cumbersome to cite all 20, I have only 
included those country programmes referenced in the text in the reference list. The priorities in 
the table are categorized according to the way in which they are formulated in the DWCP 
document. Some of the categories may overlap. The elimination of child labour, for instance, is 
often treated as a fundamental right at work. They are nonetheless presented in this way as a 
rough indication of the priority assigned to different policy areas. Because most of the DWCPs 
in West Africa were expired and new plans were being drafted at the time of writing, the 
information presented here is skewed towards Southern and Eastern Africa. However, there 
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